The impacts of risk and competition on bank profitability in China  by Tan, Yong
T
C
Y
D
a
A
R
A
A
K
B
B
R
G
C
1
o
a
p
w
C
B
t
s
w
m
i
b
l
1
lInt. Fin. Markets, Inst. and Money 40 (2016) 85–110
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal  of  International  Financial
Markets, Institutions  &  Money
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ intf in
he  impacts  of  risk  and  competition  on  bank  proﬁtability  in
hina
ong  Tan ∗
epartment of Strategy, Marketing and Economics, University of Huddersﬁeld Business School, Queensgate, Huddersﬁeld, HD1 3DH, UK
 r  t  i c  l  e  i  n  f  o
rticle history:
eceived 20 June 2014
ccepted 14 September 2015
vailable online 25 September 2015
eywords:
ank proﬁtability
ank competition
isk
MM
hina
a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Several  rounds  of  banking  reforms  in  China  have  aimed  to increase  the  competitive  con-
dition  and  further  enhance  stability  in  the Chinese  banking  sector,  while  the  joint  effects
of  competition  and  risk-taking  behaviour  on the  proﬁtability  in the  banking  sector  have
not been  studied  well  enough  so  far in  the  literature.  The  current  study  contributes  to
the empirical  literature  by  testing  the impacts  of  risk  and  competition  on proﬁtability  in
the Chinese  banking  industry  (state-owned,  joint-stock  and city  commercial  banks)  over
the period  2003–2011  under  a one-step  Generalized  Method  of  Moments  (GMM)  system
estimator.  The  results  do not  show  any  robust  ﬁnding  with regards  to  the  impacts  of  com-
petition  and  risk  on bank  proﬁtability,  while  it is found  that  Chinese  bank  proﬁtability
is  affected  by taxation,  overhead  cost,  labour  productivity  and  inﬂation.  The  study  pro-
vides  policy  implications  to the Chinese  banking  industry  and  different  ownership  types  of
Chinese  commercial  banks.
© 2015  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  B.V.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the CC
BY  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
As an important part of the ﬁnancial system, the banking sector plays a more and more important role in the development
f China’s economy. Several rounds of banking reforms in China have aimed to create a more competitive environment
nd improve the bank performance. However, stronger competition does not necessarily contribute to improvement in
roﬁtability. The structure–conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis argues that in a highly concentrated banking market
here competition is lower, the banks tend to collude with each other to obtain supernormal proﬁt. Concentration in the
hinese banking sector is quite high compared to other countries. According to the statistics of the annual report from China
anking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), at the end of 2011, the assets of ﬁve large commercial banks account for 47.3% of
he total assets in the banking industry, a decrease of 2% compared to the previous year. Comparing with other countries,
uch as Luxembourg, Germany, and Austria at the same year, the ﬁve-bank concentration ratios of which are much lower,
ith Luxembourg (31.2%), Germany (33.5%) and Austria (0.4%) (European Central Bank structural ﬁnancial indicators 2011).
The ﬁnancial crisis that happened from 2007 makes the government, banking regulatory authority and bank managersore concerned by the risk-taking behaviour of Chinese banks. Due to the special characteristics of the Chinese banking
ndustry, the operation of Chinese banks, and especially the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), is largely inﬂuenced
y the central government, which leads to the accumulation of non-performing loans. The large volumes of non-performing
oans hinder the proﬁtability improvement of Chinese banks. The credit quality of Chinese banks has improved signiﬁcantly
∗ Tel.: +44 0 1484 473578.
E-mail address: a.y.tan@hud.ac.uk
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.intﬁn.2015.09.003
042-4431/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/
icenses/by/4.0/).
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during recent years. The non-performing loan ratio of all banking institutions is 1.77% in 2011, which is 0.66% lower than
the previous year (CBRC annual report 2011). Although the ﬁgure in China is much lower than some of banking sectors in
European countries, such as Ireland and Lithuania, the non-performing loan ratios of which are 16.1% and 16.3%, respectively,
it is still higher than Luxembourg, Finland and Sweden, all of which have non-performing loan ratios below 1% (European
Banking Sector Facts and Figures 2012).
In this paper, we focus on the analysis of bank proﬁtability in China due to the fact that it reﬂects the bank management
and, especially nowadays in the Chinese banking industry, as all the banks are encouraged to be listed in the stock exchange
to obtain external monitoring and funds, a higher proﬁtability can increase the competitiveness of the bank.
Using a sample of state-owned, joint-stock and city commercial banks, this study tests whether the Chinese banking
industry is in line with the SCP hypothesis and further examines whether the improvement of risk management increases
bank proﬁtability in China. We  also control for comprehensive determinants of bank proﬁtability in order to give policy
implications to bank managers, the regulatory authority and government. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
(1) It is the ﬁrst paper among empirical banking studies to use stability inefﬁciency as the main risk indicator to test its
impact on bank proﬁtability while the risk is cross checked by Z-score and ratio of loan loss provision over total loans;
(2) we provide robust results regarding the impact of competition on bank proﬁtability by using both Lerner index and
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index as competition indicators. The use of the Lerner index as the competition indicator provides
the competitive conditions of different ownership types of Chinese banks, which ﬁlls a gap in empirical literature on Chinese
bank competition.
The results do not show any robust ﬁndings with regards to the impacts of competition and risk on Chinese bank prof-
itability. However, they show that Chinese bank proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly affected by taxation, overhead cost, labour
productivity and inﬂation. The ﬁndings further show that, compared to the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), the
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) in China have lower proﬁtability in terms of Return
on Assets (ROA), Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Proﬁt Margin (PBT). We  also do separate estimations on different types of
bank ownership and relevant ﬁndings as well as policy implications are provided.
The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the development of the Chinese banking sector;
Section 3 discusses the existing literature on bank proﬁtability and bank competition as well as the impact of competition
on bank proﬁtability. Section 4 presents the determinants of bank proﬁtability, variable selection as well as the empirical
model, followed by Section 5, which describes the data and methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section
7 provides further discussion on the empirical results. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2. Development of the Chinese banking sector
Before 1978, the Chinese banking system followed a mono-bank model. The central bank-Peoples’ Bank of China (PBC)
took the function of a central bank as well as engaging in commercial bank operations. A series of economic reforms was
initiated by the Chinese government in 1979 to transfer the planned economy to a market-based economy. The banking
sector in China was also rebuilt and redesigned through a number of reforms. The two-tier banking system was  created
during the period 1979–1993, with PBC free to serve as the central bank and four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs)1
to engage in commercial bank lending. Not only the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), but also a number of joint-
stock commercial banks (JSCBs)2, rural and urban credit cooperatives were gradually established during this period. Over
this period, the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) made loans to state-owned enterprises under government direction
with no consideration of credit check and risk monitoring which leads to the accumulation of non-performing loans. During
this period, the competition among Chinese banks is limited.
In order to alleviate the problem of large volumes of non-performing loans in state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs),
three policy banks were established by Chinese government in 1994. Their main functions were: (1) take over the responsi-
bilities undertaken by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) previously and (2) make loans under the government policies.
Thus, state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) were gradually transferred to true commercial banks; they had more freedom
in terms of credit and lending decisions.
In order to reduce the volumes of non-performing loans in state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), four assets manage-
ment companies (AMCs) (Cinda AMC, Huarong AMC, Great Wall AMC  and Oriental AMC) were established by government in
1999, with each oriented to a speciﬁc state-owned commercial bank. The AMCs purchase and manage the non-performing
loans and they were under the supervision of PBC. Up to the present, there have been three instances of non-performing loan
write-off by AMCs, which happened in 1999, 2004 and 2005, respectively. In 1999, four AMCs purchased RMB  1.4 trillion
non-performing loans from four state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and China Development Bank; in 2004, the non-
performing loans worth of RMB  278.7 billion from Bank of China and China Construction Bank were purchased by Cinda AMC
and, ﬁnally, in 2005, the non-performing loans worth of RMB  142.4 billion from Bank of China, RMB  56.9 billion from China
Construction Bank and RMB  64 billion from Bank of Communication were purchased by Oriental and Cinda AMCs. These
1 They are Bank of China (BOC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), China Construction Bank (CCB) and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
2 These banks include Citic Bank, China Merchant Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, China Everbright Bank, Industrial Bank, Guangdong Development
Bank,  HuaXia Bank and Shanghai Pudong Development Bank.
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urchases reduced the volumes of non-performing loans of Chinese state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and increased
heir competitiveness in the world.
Not only does it deal with the issue of non-performing loans, the Chinese government also takes measurements to increase
ompetition in the banking sector, such as ease the licensing and entry requirement of new small and medium domestic
anks. A number of new joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) were established in 1996, 2003, 2004 and 20053. Furthermore,
n order for the banks to obtain external funds and additional monitoring and increase the competition among banks, all
hinese banks are encouraged to be listed on the stock exchange. By the end of 2011, all the state-owned commercial banks
SOCBs) have successfully offered their initial public offerings (IPOs) with ICBC raising US$21.9 billion in Shanghai and Hong
ong stock exchanges in 2006, becoming the largest IPO at that time. Among the twelve joint-stock commercial banks
JSCBs), eight of them have been listed on the stock exchange4.
Established by the State Council in 2003, the CBRC is the primary government agency and point of control for commercial
anks. The CBRC is not only responsible for supervising commercial banking operations, but also for formulating rules
nd regulations, authorizing the establishment, changes, termination and business scope of the banking institutions and
onducting an onsite examination and offsite surveillance of their operations. The objective is to protect the interest of
epositors and maintain market conﬁdence through prudential and effective supervision.
At the end of 2011, the Chinese banking sector consisted of 3 policy banks, 5 large-scale (state-owned) commercial banks
SOCBs)5, 12 joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), 144 city commercial banks (CCBs) and a large number of other ﬁnancial
nstitutions, such as credit cooperatives, foreign banks, trust companies, ﬁnance companies of enterprise groups, etc. The
roportion of assets of large-scale state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) in the total banking sector assets keeps decreasing
rom 2003 to the lowest point in 2011, which is 47.3%, while on the other hand, the proportion of assets of joint-stock and
ity commercial banks in the total banking sector assets keeps increasing from 2003 to the highest points of 16.22% and
.81% in 2011, respectively.
In summary, several rounds of banking reforms in China have aimed to increase the competitive condition and lower risk-
aking behaviour, which is supposed to have inﬂuence on bank proﬁtability. Our study examines the impacts of competition
nd risk on the proﬁtability of Chinese banks.
. Literature review
.1. Empirical literature on bank proﬁtability
The empirical literature investigating bank proﬁtability can be divided into two streams: one of which focuses on the
nalysis of bank proﬁtability in multiple country studies, while the second group of literature places emphasis on the
xamination of bank proﬁtability in single country studies. Table 1 gives a summary of the studies mentioned above.
There are a number of studies investigating proﬁtability in the Chinese banking sector. The studies can be divided into
hree groups according to the methods used, which are principal analysis, ﬁxed effect estimator and Generalized Method of
oments (GMM)  estimator. Shih et al. (2007) investigate the performance of the big four, joint-stock and city commercial
anks in China under the principal analysis. The results indicate that joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) have better
erformance than state-owned and city commercial banks. They argue that the impact of size on bank performance is
nsigniﬁcant.
The second stream of studies uses the ﬁxed effect estimator to investigate the determinants of bank proﬁtability in China.
uﬁan (2009) uses this method to evaluate the determinants of proﬁtability for four state-owned and twelve joint-stock
ommercial banks in China over the period 2000–2007. The ﬁndings show that Chinese commercial banks with higher
evels of credit risk, higher levels of capitalization and larger size in terms of total assets have higher proﬁtability, while
hinese commercial banks with higher levels of liquidity and higher levels of overhead costs have lower proﬁtability. The
ndings ﬁnally show that both economic growth and inﬂation precede an improvement in bank proﬁtability in China. The
ame method has been used by Suﬁan and Habibullah (2009) to assess the determinants of Chinese bank proﬁtability over
he period 2000–2005. Their ﬁndings suggest that higher levels of risk, higher levels of capitalization and higher levels of
iquidity lead to higher proﬁtability for state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), whereas higher levels of risk and lower
evels of cost lead to higher proﬁtability for joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs). Finally, they ﬁnd that larger bank size,
n terms of total assets and higher levels of costs, lead to lower proﬁtability for city commercial banks (CCBs), while city
ommercial banks (CCBs) with higher levels of capitalization and more diversiﬁed business have higher proﬁtability.
Most of the research papers on Chinese banking proﬁtability use the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  estimator.
arcia-Herrero et al. (2009) use the two-step GMM  system estimator to explain the low proﬁtability of Chinese commercial
anks over the period 1997–2004. Their results show that higher proﬁtability can be achieved by the banks with higher levels
3 They are: China Minsheng Bank, China Evergrowing Bank, China Zheshang Bank and China Bohai Bank.
4 They are: China Merchant Bank, China Citic Bank, Hua Xia Bank, China Everbright Bank, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China Minsheng Bank,
ndustrial Bank and Ping An bank (Shenzhen Development bank).
5 They are: Bank of China (BOC), China Construction Bank (CCB), Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) and
ank  of Communication (BOCOM).
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Table 1
Summary of recent studies on investigation of proﬁtability in European, US and Emerging market banking sectors.
References Banking sector
investigated
Data period Methodology Empirical results
Staikouras and Wood
(2004)
European
banking sector
1994–1998 Fixed effect
estimator
There is a negative impact of risk on bank
proﬁtability
Goddard et al. (2004a) European
banking sector
1992–1998 GMM two-step
system
estimator
There is a positive impact of diversiﬁcation on
bank proﬁtability in UK
Goddard et al. (2004b) European
banking sector
1992–1998 OLS and GMM
two-step
system
estimator
The impact of size on bank proﬁtability is
weak, while the inﬂuence of off-balance-sheet
items on bank proﬁtability is different across
the countries and capital-assets ratio has a
signiﬁcant and positive impact on bank
proﬁtability
Pasiouras and
Kosmidou (2007)
European
banking sector
1995–2001 GMM one-step
system
estimator
The proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly affected by
banking sector concentration
Maudos and Fernandez
de Guevara (2004)
European
banking sector
1993–2000 Macshane and
Sharpe (1985)
and Angbanzo
(1997)
single-stage
approach
Increase in market power and concentration
leads to fall of margins
Goddard et al. (2013) European
banking sector
1992–2007 GMM two-step
system
estimator
Proﬁtability is higher for banks that are
efﬁcient and diversiﬁed, while lower for those
which are higher capitalized
Athanasoglou et al.
(2008)
Greek banking
sector
1985–2001 GMM one-step
system
estimator
Capitalization, credit risk, productivity growth
and operating expenses management are
signiﬁcantly related to bank proﬁtability in
Greece
Dietrich and
Wanzenried (2011)
Switzerland
banking sector
1999–2009 GMM two-step
system
estimator
Banks with diversiﬁed activities have higher
proﬁtability
Hoffmann (2011) US banking
sector
1995–2007 GMM two-step
system
estimator
There is a signiﬁcant impact of capital ratio on
bank proﬁtability
Chronopoulos et al.
(2013)
US banking
sector
1984–2010 System GMM
with
Windmeijer-
corrected
standard errors
Competition process reduces positions of
abnormal proﬁtability, while the ﬁnancial
crisis appears to have resulted in an increase in
the persistence of bank proﬁtability
Suﬁan (2011) Korean
banking sector
1986–1995 Fixed effect
estimator
Risk is negative related to bank proﬁtability
while concentration has positive effect
Liu and Wilson (2010) Japanese
banking sector
2000–2007 GMM two-step
system
estimator and
ﬁxed effect
estimator
Well capitalized and efﬁcient banks with lower
credit risks tend to have higher proﬁtability
than less capitalized and less efﬁcient banks
with higher credit risks, while industry
concentration, stock market development and
GDP growth signiﬁcantly inﬂuence bank
proﬁtability
Suﬁan and Chong
(2008)
Philippine
banking sector
1990–2005 Fixed effect
estimator
Risk is negatively related to bank proﬁtability
of capitalization, higher X-efﬁciency and larger shares of deposits. The ﬁndings also report that Chinese commercial banks
have higher proﬁtability in a less concentrated banking market. Finally, the results indicate that joint-stock commercial
banks (JSCBs) have higher proﬁtability than state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) over the examined period. The two-
step GMM  system estimator is also used by Tan and Floros (2012a) to test the impact of inﬂation on bank proﬁtability in
China over the period 2003–2009. Their results show that Chinese banks with lower levels of diversiﬁcation, lower levels of
overhead cost and lower levels of taxation have higher proﬁtability; while they ﬁnd that higher developed banking market
and higher developed stock market lead to proﬁtability improvement in Chinese commercial banks. Finally, the results
show that Chinese commercial banks have higher proﬁtability in a higher inﬂationary environment. Rather than using the
two-step GMM  system estimator, Tan and Floros (2012b) use the one-step GMM  system estimator to examine the impact
of GDP growth on bank proﬁtability in China over the period 2003–2009. Their ﬁndings suggest that Chinese commercial
banks have lower proﬁtability during the periods of economic boom (higher GDP growth rate).Instead of using two-step GMM  system estimators, Tan and Floros (2012c) use both the one-step difference estimator and
one-step system estimator to investigate the impact of stock market volatility on bank performance in China over the period
2003–2009. Four performance indicators are used, namely the return on equity (ROE), excess return on equity (EROE), Net
Interest Margin (NIM) and Economic Value Added (EVA). Their results show that state-owned and joint-stock commercial
b
l
b
t
ﬁ
a
o
t
T
t
o
3
m
m
S
t
e
o
e
t
t
t
s
z
t
m
c
o
c
c
t
b
s
p
A
t
m
s
z
a
o
e
i
H
t
i
(
r
a
B
i
(Y. Tan / Int. Fin. Markets, Inst. and Money 40 (2016) 85–110 89
anks with higher levels of taxation have lower ROE and EROE, while joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) with higher
evels of capitalization have lower ROE and EROE. In addition, they report that state-owned and joint-stock commercial
anks with lower levels of overhead cost and higher levels of labour productivity have higher EVA and NIM. They also ﬁnd
hat state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) with higher levels of diversiﬁed business have lower EVA and NIM. Finally, the
ndings report that lower levels of risk, lower levels of taxation and a higher developed banking sector lead to higher EVA
nd NIM for joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs).
Both the two-step GMM  estimator and ﬁxed effect estimator are used by Heffernan and Fu (2010) to test the determinants
f performance for state-owned, joint-stock, city and rural commercial banks over the period 1999–2006. Their ﬁndings show
hat banks with higher efﬁciency have better performance and bank listing contributes to the performance improvement.
hey further ﬁnd that Chinese bank proﬁtability is signiﬁcantly affected by real GDP growth rate and unemployment, while
he impacts of bank size and off-balance-sheet activities on bank proﬁtability are insigniﬁcant. Finally, compared to state-
wned, joint-stock and city commercial bank, the rural commercial banks in China have better performance.
.2. Empirical literature on bank competition and its measurement
The empirical literature uses a number of methods to estimate competition in the banking sector through analysing
arket power and efﬁciency. Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982) develop a method to estimate bank competition through
easuring market power. This method has been recently used by Bikker (2003), Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) and Qin and
haffer (2014). The aggregate level of bank behaviour is analysed and average conjectural variation of banks is estimated
hrough this method. This model is based on two structural equations, namely inverse demand equation and a supply
quation, both of which are derived from the ﬁrst order condition of proﬁt maximization. This model estimates the mark-up
f price over marginal cost as a measure of market power. Thus, this method is also called mark-up test. If the output price
quals marginal cost, as reﬂected by a zero value of conjectural variation, there is perfect competition in the market, while
he value equals to one, which indicates that there is a monopoly in the market.
The second approach that measured the bank competition is developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987). The model measures
he extent to which a change in a vector of input prices is reﬂected in gross revenue. Thus, this method is also called
he revenue test. The H-statistic is used in the method to estimate bank competition. The H-statistic is deﬁned as the
um of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenues with respect to the input prices. A value equal to or smaller than
ero indicates that the market is operated under monopoly, while A value of H-statistic between zero and one suggests
hat the market is in a condition of monopolistic competition, and if the value of H-statistic equals 1, it shows that the
arket is perfectly competitive. This approach has been widely used in the empirical literature to measure banking sector
ompetition (see Bikker and Haaf, 2002; Matthews et al., 2007; Goddard and Wilson, 2009; Barbosa et al., 2015, among
thers).
The third type of indicator to measure bank competition is through the analysis of market power. There are two indi-
ators, which are Hirschman–Herﬁndahl index (HHI) and concentration ratio, both of which measure the degree of market
oncentration. These two  indicators are used based on the structure–conduct–performance (SCP) hypothesis, which makes
he assumption that the banks’ behaviour is affected by market power, while the market structure plays a decisive role in
ank performance. The idea of this hypothesis is based on the fact that in a more concentrated market where signiﬁcant
hares are occupied by a few banks, the competitive condition is lower, while higher concentration leads to greater market
ower, and the resultant increase in the collusive behaviour leads to higher proﬁts. These indicators were recently used by
l-Muharrami et al. (2006) and Fu et al. (2014) to measure competition in the banking industry.
Market power can be also reﬂected from proﬁtability due to the fact that higher proﬁts achieved by the bank may  indicate
hat there is a lower level of competition. The price-cost margin is an indicator used to measure proﬁtability. The proﬁt-cost
argin can be estimated by the difference between output price and marginal cost, then divided by the output price. The
o-called Lerner index is widely used in the empirical literature to measure the competition. The Lerner index ranges from
ero to one. The Lerner index equals zero under the condition of perfect competition; the degree of competition decreases
s the increase in the value of Lerner index. The market is operated under monopoly if the value of the Lerner index equals
ne. Empirical literature using the Lerner index to measure competition includes Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012), Fungacova
t al. (2014), among others.
The SCP hypothesis, as discussed above, suggests that market structure affects competitive behaviour which further
nﬂuences bank performance. In other words, this hypothesis argues that bank proﬁtability is derived from market structure.
owever, Demsetz (1973) develops the efﬁcient–structure hypothesis, which argues that different proﬁtability achieved by
he bank is derived from efﬁciency. Thus, this hypothesis suggests that banks with higher efﬁciency have higher ability to
ncrease their market shares and bank size, which further leads to excess proﬁt. A new indicator was developed by Boone
2008) to measure bank competition. The so-called Boone indicator considers the impact of efﬁciency on performance with
egards to proﬁtability and market share. It also considers that competition improves the performance of efﬁcient ﬁrms
nd weakens the performance of inefﬁcient ones. The Boone indicator can be positive as well as negative. A more negative
oone indicator indicates that there is a higher level of competition, while a larger positive value indicates the competition
s lower. Considerable literature recently has used this measurement of competition in the banking sector, including Delis
2012), Tabak et al. (2012), among others.
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3.3. The impact of competition on bank proﬁtability
There are some hypotheses in the empirical literature investigating the inﬂuence of competition on ﬁrm’s proﬁtability.
Using concentration ratio and Herﬁndal index as the indicators of market structure, the structure–conduct–performance
(SCP) hypothesis argues that through offering lower deposit rates and charging higher loan rates, ﬁrms have the ability
to extract monopolistic rents in a concentrated market. In other words, this hypothesis suggests that lower competition
resulting from higher concentration in the market leads to market power, which enables ﬁrms to earn monopolistic or
abnormal proﬁt. There are a number of pieces of research providing support to the SCP hypothesis, and the research is
undertaken by Rose and Fraser (1976), Heggestad and Mingo (1977), Berger and Hannan (1989), Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994);
and Samad (2008), among others. Moreover, Gilbert (1984) conducted a survey and provided a summary of 44 studies with
regards to the relationship between market concentration and bank performance. The ﬁndings show that among the 44
studies, 32 of them reported that there is a signiﬁcant and positive impact of concentration on bank performance.
Alternatively, it is argued that the signiﬁcant impact of competition (concentration) on ﬁrm proﬁtability does not arise
from market power but from higher efﬁciency of ﬁrms with larger market share. This Efﬁcient Structure Hypothesis (ESH),
as indicated by Demsetz (1973), suggests that the ﬁrms with higher efﬁciency have higher ability to increase their market
shares and ﬁrms’ sizes, while this higher efﬁciency allowed the ﬁrms to concentrate and the resulting lower competition
leads to higher proﬁt (Lloyd-Williams et al., 1994). Lloyd-Williams et al. (1994) further argue that the proﬁt can be maximized
by the banks with higher efﬁciency mainly through two ways: (1) maintaining the current market size and pricing policies;
(2) accommodating size expansion and price reduction strategies, while Berger (1995) suggest that the proﬁt as well as the
market share can be increased by a more efﬁcient bank with superior management or production technology. The above two
statements (Berger, 1995) can also be explained from the perspectives of two different efﬁciencies, namely X-efﬁciency and
scale efﬁciency. The X-efﬁciency is related to superior management of production and technologies, the banks with higher
X-efﬁciency have higher ability to lower the operation cost and increase the proﬁt. On the other hand, the scale efﬁciency
assumes that the banks have the same management level and technology; however, they have different operation scales,
and some banks produce in a more efﬁcient scale than their counterparts, the higher efﬁcient scales lead to a reduction of
unit cost and an increase in unit proﬁt. The efﬁciency-structure hypothesis is supported by studies of Brozen (1982) and
Seelanatha (2010). Both of these two hypotheses hold the viewpoint that higher efﬁciency or larger market power increases
concentration, which leads to a reduction in competition.
However, the contestable market theory (CMT), as developed by Baumol (1982), argues that if there was  no barrier for
new entrants to enter the market, a concentrated industry can behave competitively. In other words, in a higher concentrated
banking market which is dominated by few large banks, there is still a higher level of competition. This positive relationship
between concentration and competition can be further explained by the fact that in a contestable market, some ﬁrms are
driven out of the market because of more competition, while a higher concentration is the result of more competition.
Through reviewing the empirical literature on proﬁtability in the banking sector, most of the studies ﬁnd that banks
with higher risk have lower proﬁtability, while the impact of competition on bank proﬁtability is ambiguous. Further-
more, the empirical researches report that there are comprehensive factors inﬂuencing bank proﬁtability, such as bank size,
capitalization, liquidity, overhead cost, inﬂation and GDP growth rate.
Although there are studies investigating the impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability, they use traditional
accounting ratio to measure the bank risk and concentration ratio as the measurement of competition. This study provides
the robust analysis regarding the impacts of risk and competition by ﬁrstly attempting to use stability inefﬁciency as a risk
indicator, which is cross checked by ratio of loan loss provision over total loans and Z-score. More importantly, we  use the
Lerner index which ﬁrstly evaluates the competitive conditions of different ownership types of banks in Chinese banking
literature and the Lerner index is also cross-checked by Herﬁndal–Hirschman index.
4. Determinants of bank proﬁtability, variable selection and empirical model
4.1. Determinants of bank proﬁtability
4.1.1. Bank-speciﬁc determinants
Bank size: we use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure this variable. This measurement is widely used in the
empirical literature (see Goddard et al., 2004a,b; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011 among others). On
the one hand, banks with larger size are able to reduce costs from economies of scale and scope (Akhavein et al., 1997; Bourke,
1989; Molyneux and Thornton, 1992; Bikker and Hu, 2002; Goddard et al., 2004a,b; Iannotta et al., 2007; Mercieca et al.,
2007; Elsas et al., 2010). On the other hand, Barros et al. (2007) argue that the asymmetric information problems associated
with leading can be reduced by smaller and specialized banks, preceding a negative impact of size on bank proﬁtability.
Furthermore, Berger and Humphrey (1994) argue that small banks can obtain economies of scale by increasing their size to
a certain point where further increase in size will result in diseconomies of scale. This is supported by Athanasoglou et al.
(2008), who argue that proﬁtability initially increases with size and then declines for bureaucratic and other reasons. So
there is not a prior expectation on the impact of this variable on bank proﬁtability.
Liquidity: we use the ratio of total loans over total assets to measure this variable. We  follow Goddard et al. (2013) for
the choice of this measurement. It reﬂects the possible inability of banks to accommodate decreases in liabilities or fund
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ncreases on the assets’ side of the balance sheet (Tan and Floros, 2012a). The larger ﬁgure of this ratio indicates that there
s a lower liquidity level. However, a large volume of loans implies that there is more interest revenue generated. Hence, a
egative impact of liquidity on bank proﬁtability is expected, which is consistent with the ﬁndings of Molyneux and Thornton
1992). However, it is in direct contrast with the ﬁndings of Bourke (1989) in relation to the European banking industry who
rgues that banks with higher liquidity levels have higher proﬁtability. Higher volume of loans will lead to a decline in bank
roﬁtability if the bank does not have a good risk management system. So there is no a prior expectation for this variable.
Risk: we use the ratio of loan loss provision over total loans (LLPTL) to measure this variable. A higher ratio suggests that
he bank has higher risk. Empirical studies indicate that an increase in risk exposure leads to a decrease in bank proﬁtability
see Miller and Noulas, 1997). Therefore, we expect that there will be a negative impact of LLPTL on bank proﬁtability in China.
ue to the fact that in Chinese banking industry, all the banks are required to hold more than enough loan loss provision to
nhance the risk management, this volume will be set at the beginning of the year, thus this variable should be treated as a
redetermined variable. We  complement this measurement and check the robustness of the result by employing another
wo alternative risk indicators, which are Z-score and stability inefﬁciency derived from frontier estimation6. The Z-score is
sed by a number of empirical studies as the risk/stability indicator in the banking sector (see Iannotta et al., 2007; Liu et al.,
013; Liu and Wilson, 2013) and it is calculated by using the sum of a bank’s return on assets and equity to total assets ratio
ver the standard deviation of the bank’s return on assets. A higher Z-score indicates that there is a higher stability and lower
isk. However, Fang et al. (2011) argue that the potential stability that each bank can achieve is not reﬂected by Z-score, and
he deviation from the bank’s current stability and the maximum stability given the economic and regulatory conditions
ust be considered. Therefore, the so-called “stability inefﬁciency” is invented. So negative impact of risk on proﬁtability is
xpected.
Capitalization: we use the ratio of shareholders’ equity over total assets to proxy this variable (see Athanasoglou et al.,
008; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). This variable is important in explaining the performance
f ﬁnancial institutions. A positive impact of capitalization on bank proﬁtability is expected for the following reasons: ﬁrst,
he funding cost can be reduced for the banks with higher capital levels due to the fact that a higher capital ratio indicates that
he banks have higher creditworthiness. Second, the banks with higher capital levels are more likely to engage in prudent
ending, which leads to an increase in bank proﬁtability. Third, capital plays an important role in absorbing the risk arising
rom higher risk assets, such as loans; the interest revenue generated from loans fosters bank proﬁtability. Finally, the banks
ith higher capital levels need to borrow less, which reduces cost and further increases proﬁtability. However, Berger (1995)
rgues that capitalization can have a negative impact on bank proﬁtability because the higher the level of capitalization,
he lower the relative risk position of the bank. According to the risk-return trade-off, lower risk leads to lower return. This
s supported by Modigliani and Miller (1963) and more recently by Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011). So we do not have a
rior expectation on the impact of this variable on bank proﬁtability. While the opposite causation is produced according to
he relaxation of one–period assumption, which argues that the increase in earnings is allowed to increase the capital ratio.
hus, capital is modelled as the endogenous variable7.
Cost management: we use the ratio of overhead cost over total assets to measure this variable. This measurement has been
sed extensively in the empirical literature (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Liu and Wilson, 2010; Garcia-Herrero et al.,
009; Kosmidou, 2008). Athanasoglou et al. (2008) argue that well-managed banks have the ability to reduce operating costs,
hich led to an increase in bank proﬁtability in Greece. This opinion is supported by Bourke (1989); and Jiang et al. (2003),
mong others. However, there is a positive impact of operating expenses on proﬁtability in the European banking industry
Molyneux and Thornton, 1992). This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that large volume of operating expenses is derived
rom paying salaries and wages to staff, while higher levels of salaries and wages paid to staff signiﬁcantly improve the
taff productivity, while the resulting improvement in the bank proﬁtability is much larger than the salaries and wages paid
ut by the bank. This explanation is also in line with the efﬁciency wage theory. The positive impact of operating expenses
n proﬁtability is also supported by Ben Naceur (2003) in terms of the Tunisian banking industry. So there is no a prior
xpectation for this variable.
Diversiﬁcation: we measure this variable by using the ratio of non-interest income over gross revenue. As argued by
an and Floros (2012a), more income can be generated when banks are engaged in a number of different businesses. In
ddition, the banks with more diversiﬁed activities have the ability to reduce their costs from economies of scope. Thus, a
ositive impact of diversiﬁcation on bank proﬁtability is expected. This is in line with the ﬁndings of Jiang et al. (2003) in
erms of the Hong Kong banking industry. However, Gischer and Juttner (2001) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)
rgue that there is a negative relationship between diversiﬁcation and bank proﬁtability due to the fact that, compared to
he traditional interest income activity, there is stronger competition in the area of fee-income generating business, which
recedes a decrease in bank proﬁtability. So there is no a prior expectation for this variable.
6 See Appendix for more detail about the estimation.
7 Clear process has been followed to ﬁnd the endogenous variables. The same model has been tested twice, with the ﬁrst time the capital treated as
xogenous variable and second time as endogenous variable. The results of Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions indicate that the capital should be
reated  as endogenous variable. Furthermore, the same test has been conducted on other variables as well and the results show that the ratio of loan loss
rovisions over total loans should be treated as predetermined variable.
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Labour productivity: we use the ratio of gross revenue over total number of employees to measure this variable. This
variable has been widely used in the empirical literature to examine its impact on bank proﬁtability (see Athanasoglou et al.,
2008; Tan and Floros, 2012a–c). Higher labour productivity not only reﬂects efﬁcient bank management, but also increases
the bank’s efﬁciency and further fosters the bank’s proﬁtability. So we  expect that this variable has a positive impact on bank
proﬁtability.
Taxation: the ratio of tax over operating proﬁt before tax is used to measure this variable. This measurement has been
used by Tan and Floros (2012a–c) in the Chinese banking industry. The ﬁndings of Tan and Floros (2012a–c) show that there
is a signiﬁcant and negative impact of taxation on bank proﬁtability in China. This can be explained by the fact that higher
level of taxes incurred by the banks increase the bank cost and further leads to a reduction in bank proﬁtability, thus, we
expect that this variable has a negative impact on bank proﬁtability.
4.1.2. Industry-speciﬁc determinants
Competition: we use Lerner index/Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index to measure this variable. The SCP hypothesis argues that
ﬁrms in a ﬁnancial system with less competition (higher Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index and higher Lerner index) tend to have
larger scales of operation, which leads to a higher degree of proﬁt. This is supported by Claessens and Laeven (2004). However,
on the other hand, the competition-efﬁciency hypothesis argues that in a higher competitive environment, banks managers
have more incentive to improve efﬁciency; the cost reduction derived from efﬁciency improvement further precedes an
increase in proﬁtability. So we do not have any a prior expectation on the sign of this variable.
Banking sector development: we use the ratio of banking sector assets over GDP to measure this variable. This is a country-
speciﬁc rather than a region-speciﬁc variable and it is widely used by empirical studies (see Tan and Floros, 2012a–c). Tan
and Floros (2012a) suggest that there is a signiﬁcant and positive impact of banking sector development on bank proﬁtability
in China. They argue that in a higher developed banking sector, the demand for banking services increases, which will attract
more potential competitors to enter the market. However, although the Chinese banking sector has been gradually opened
up through several rounds of banking reforms, it is still difﬁcult for new banks to enter the market. The reduction in supply
of banking services relative to the increased demand increases the prices of banking services and further increases the
proﬁtability of existing banks. So we expect that this variable has a positive impact on bank proﬁtability.
Stock market development: we use the ratio of market capitalization of listed companies over GDP to measure this variable.
According to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Bashir (2000), banks in countries with well-developed stock markets
normally have higher proﬁtability. The reasons can be explained as follows: (1) higher developed stock market increases
the number of ﬁrms to obtain funds from stock market rather than banks, this not only reduces the volume of loan service
provided by banks, but decreases the risk of loan default, the risk reduction leads to an increase in bank proﬁtability.
Furthermore, the risk reduction also increases the borrowing capacity of banks, which fosters bank proﬁtability. Finally, the
stock market provides more information on the public traded ﬁrms, which makes it easier for banks to evaluate and monitor
the risk. Thus, it precedes a reduction of bank cost and an increase in bank proﬁtability (Tan and Floros, 2012a). So we expect
that this variable has a positive impact on bank proﬁtability. In other words, it can be concluded that banks and the stock
market complement each other and therefore they grow together when they develop. This correlation between banking
sector development and stock market development is conﬁrmed by the research undertaken by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine
(1996), Garcia and Liu (1999), Li (2007), among others.
4.1.3. Macroeconomic determinants
Inﬂation: we use the annual inﬂation rate to measure this variable. Inﬂation is an important determinant of bank perfor-
mance. The impact of inﬂation on bank proﬁtability is ﬁrstly examined by Revell (1979) and further investigated by Perry
(1992). Both of them argue that the effect depends on whether inﬂation is anticipated or unanticipated. If inﬂation rate is
fully anticipated, banks can adjust the interest rates or manage the operating expenses accordingly to make the revenues
increase faster than costs, which leads to higher proﬁtability, while if inﬂation is not fully anticipated, the loan losses will be
accumulated, which leads to a decrease in bank proﬁtability, thus, there is no a prior expectation for the impact of inﬂation
on bank proﬁtability.
GDP growth rate: some of the researchers argue that it has a positive impact on bank proﬁtability due to the fact that
the demand for lending increases during cyclical upswings (see Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Bikker and Hu, 2002;
Athanasoglou et al., 2008). However, Tan and Floros (2012b) ﬁnd that GDP growth rate has a negative impact on bank prof-
itability in China. They suggest that higher economic growth improves the business environment and lowers the bank entry
barriers. The consequently increased competition dampens bank’s proﬁtability. So we  do not have any a prior expectation
for this variable.
4.2. Variable selection
The main goal of this paper is to test the impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability in China while controlling
for comprehensive bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic variables. There are four proﬁtability indicators
considered in the study: Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity (ROE), Net Interest Margin (NIM) and Proﬁt Margin (PBT)
(see Table 2). ROA, ROE and NIM are used to compare the results with the ﬁndings reported in the literature, while the
inclusion of PBT as one of the proﬁtability indicators follows the study of Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).
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Table  2
Summary of the variables used in the current study and their expected effects on bank proﬁtability.
Variables Measurement Expected effect Source
Proﬁtability indicators
ROA Net income/total assets Bank-scope
ROE  Net income/shareholder’s equity Bank-scope
NIM  Net interest income/earning assets Bank-scope
PBT Proﬁt before tax/total assets Bank-scope
Bank-speciﬁc variables
Bank size Natural logarithm of total assets ? Bank-scope
Bank  risk (LLPTL) Loan loss provision/total loans − Bank-scope
Bank  risk (Z-score) Ratio between a bank’s return on assets plus equity
capital/total assets and the standard deviation of the return on
assets
Bank-scope
Bank risk (stability inefﬁciency) Estimated from stochastic frontier (see Appendix) Bank-scope
Liquidity Loans/assets ? Bank-scope
Capitalization Shareholder’s equity/total assets ? Bank-scope
Overhead cost Overhead/total assets ? Bank-scope
Diversiﬁcation Non-interest income/gross revenue ? Bank-scope
Labour productivity Gross revenue/total number of employees + Bank-scope
Taxation Tax/operating proﬁt before tax − Bank-scope
Industry-speciﬁc variables
Competition (Lerner index) Estimated from the cost function (see Appendix) ? Bank-scope
Competition (three-bank
concentration ratio)
Total assets of largest three banks/total assets of the whole
banking industry
? CBRC
Banking sector development Banking sector assets/GDP + CBRC
Stock  market development Market capitalization of listed companies/GDP + World bank
Macroeconomic variables
Inﬂation Annual inﬂation rate ? World bank
GDP  growth rate Annual GDP growth rate ? World bank
+ Means positive effect; − Means negative effect; ? Means no indication.
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tROA shows the proﬁts earned per unit of assets and reﬂects the management ability to utilize banks’ ﬁnancial and real
nvestment resources to generate proﬁts (Hassan and Bashir, 2003). ROA has emerged as the key ratio for the evaluation
f bank proﬁtability and has become the most common measure of bank proﬁtability in the literature (Athanasoglou et al.,
008; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Golin, 2001). Fig. 1a shows the proﬁtability of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs),
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joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs)8 over the examined period. In general, JSCBs have
the lowest proﬁtability and the difference of proﬁtability between city and state-owned commercial banks is small.
ROE measures the return to shareholders on their equity and it reﬂects how much proﬁt a bank generates with the money
which shareholders have invested. Although ROE is commonly used in the ﬁnancial literature, it is not the best proﬁtability
indicator for the following reasons. First, banks with higher levels of equity (lower leverage) normally have a higher ROA but
a lower ROE. Second, ROE disregards the higher risk that is associated with higher leverage and the effect of regulation on
leverage (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011). Fig. 1b shows the proﬁtability (ROE) of three different groups of Chinese banks.
The results suggest that state-owned and city commercial banks have nearly the same proﬁtability, while there is a strong
volatility of proﬁtability for joint-stock commercial banks.
Further, Net Interest Margin (NIM) is the third proﬁtability indicator and it has been widely used in research on bank
performance (Dietrich and Wanzenried, 2011; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Tan and Floros, 2012a–c). It reﬂects how successful
a bank’s investment decisions are relative to its interest expenses. The difference between ROA and NIM is that the former
emphasizes the proﬁt earned per unit of assets while the latter focuses on the proﬁt earned on the interest generating
activities. Fig. 1c shows that the NIM of city commercial banks (CCBs) was highest over the period 2004–2011, while the
NIM of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is slightly higher than joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) in general.
Finally, the proﬁt margin is used as one of the proﬁtability indicators. The difference between ROA and proﬁt margin lies
in the fact that the latter considers the tax expenses in bank proﬁtability. We  include this indicator to see whether tax has
an inﬂuence on Chinese bank proﬁtability. When measured by the proﬁt margin, we  ﬁnd from Fig. 1d that the proﬁtability
of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is higher than city commercial banks (CCBs) in general, while the joint-stock
commercial banks (JSCBs) have the lowest proﬁtability. This result indicates that joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) pay
higher taxes.
In summary, we use comprehensive proﬁtability indicators to examine the Chinese bank proﬁtability. They reﬂect dif-
ferent aspects of banking operations. To be more speciﬁc, ROA represent bank’s ability to generate proﬁts from assets, while
ROE is related to banks’ ﬁnancing and leverage decisions, NIM more speciﬁcally focuses on lending activities, while proﬁt
margin consider the tax effect on bank proﬁtability. The different proﬁtability indicators reﬂect the Chinese banking prof-
itability from different perspectives, which gives the widest overview of Chinese bank proﬁtability to government and it is
helpful for the government to make accurate policies.
4.3. Empirical model
This study follows and expands the speciﬁcation proposed by Athanasoglou et al. (2008), which can be expressed as
follows:
IIit = C + ıIIi,t−1 +
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j=1
ˇjX
j
it
+
l∑
l=1
ˇlX
l
it +
m∑
m=1
ˇmX
m
it + JSCBsit + ϑCCBsit + vit + it (1)
where i refers to year and t refers to an individual bank, IIit represents the proﬁtability indicator for the speciﬁc bank at a
speciﬁc year, C is constant term, IIi,t − 1 is one period lagged proﬁtability. Xit are determinants of bank proﬁtability. They are
grouped into bank-speciﬁc determinants Xj
it
; industry-speciﬁc determinants Xl
it
and macroeconomic determinants Xm
it
. The
unobserved bank-speciﬁc effect and the idiosyncratic error are represented by it and it, respectively. ˇj,ˇl, and ˇm are
coefﬁcients to be estimated, while ı represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium. Its value ranges from 0 to 1 with a
higher ﬁgure representing slower adjustment and less competitive structure while a lower ﬁgure indicates that there is a
stronger competitive condition and higher speed of adjustment. In the model, two dummy variables are added, which are
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs), represented by JSCBs and CCBs, respectively, to
compare their proﬁtability to the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).
5. Data and methodology
5.1. Data
The banking data includes 41 Chinese commercial banks (5 state-owned commercial banks, 11 joint-stock commercial
banks and 25 city commercial banks) over the period 2003–2011. Due to the fact that not all selected banks have available
information for all years, an unbalanced panel dataset is opted not to lose degrees of freedom9. With regards to the data
sources, the bank-speciﬁc variables are from bankscope database which is maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk. It is
8 The current study includes state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks only due to the fact that these
three  types of ownership represent the largest three banking groups according to the assets. Furthermore, most of these banks, especially state-owned
commercial banks and joint-stock commercial banks, operate nationwide, which better reﬂects the true picture of competitive condition in the Chinese
banking industry.
9 Each bank in the sample has a minimum number of consecutive observations of 3 years.
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onsidered to be the most comprehensive database for research in banking. While the industry-speciﬁc variables are from
hina Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) annual reports, the macroeconomic data (inﬂation and annual GDP growth
ate) is from the World Bank database. Table 2 gives a summary of the variables used in the study and their expected impacts
n bank proﬁtability.
Fig. 2 shows the competitive conditions of the Chinese banking industry over the examined period. As measured by the
erner index, which is reﬂected by Fig. 2a, it is found that the city commercial banks (CCBs) have lower competition over
he period 2005–2009. This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that, unlike the state-owned and joint-stock commercial
anks, all the city commercial banks (CCBs) are not listed on the stock exchange, and their funds are mainly from the city
overnment and local enterprises and they have no incentive to compete in order to get funds from public. Furthermore,
e report that the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) have the highest competition over most years of the examined
eriod. This ﬁnding is due to the fact that, unlike state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), which are fully supported by
he government, the joint-stock commercial banks’ operation is largely attributed to the contribution from shareholders.
he incentive to attract more shareholders leads to highest competition. When looking at the competitive condition of
hinese banking sector on a year by year basis, which is measured by the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index as reﬂected by
ig. 2b, it is notable that the index keeps declining over the examined period except for the year 2008, which shows a slight
ncrease compared to 2007. This indicates that the competitive condition in Chinese banking industry has been increasing in
eneral, while the slight decrease in the competitive condition in 2008 compared to 2007 can be explained by the fact that
he Olympic Games in Beijing gave larger banks (especially state-owned commercial banks) advantages to make loans to
arge infrastructure construction projects. The substantially increase in the market share of state-owned commercial banks
SOCBs) further increases the Herﬁndahl index and leads to a relatively less competitive condition.
Fig. 3a–c reports the risk conditions of Chinese banks over the period 2003–2011 as measured by the ratio of loan loss
rovision over total loans (LLPTL), Z-score and stability inefﬁciency, respectively. Fig. 3a shows that the volume of loan loss
rovision is the highest in city commercial banks after 2004. We explain this ﬁnding by mainly two  reasons: (1) compared to
he state-owned and joint-stock commercial banks, the city commercial banks (CCBs) have a short history and they lack the
bility of risk management; (2) the city commercial banks (CCBs) normally make loans to local enterprises within the city,
nd the small enterprises have higher probability of default on loans. We  further report that, the joint-stock commercial
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banks (JSCBs) have higher risk than state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) over the period 2004–2008 due to the fact that
stronger competition among joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) induces bank mangers to undertake higher risk in order
to obtain higher return.
Z-score, another risk indicator, as represented by Fig. 3b, shows that in most of the years joint-stock commercial banks
(JSCBs) have the highest risk and city commercial banks (CCBs) have the lowest risk. Comparing this to the LLPTL which
focuses on lending risk, the Z-score is an indicator of insolvency risk. In other words, it emphasizes banks’ volatility of
return. The lowest volatility of return of city commercial banks (CCBs) can be explained by the fact that they mainly operate
within the city where they were established and the number of business engaged by them is very limited, which leads to a
relative stable return.
Finally, we look at the risk condition of the Chinese banking industry on a year by year basis, which is reﬂected by the
stability inefﬁciency as shown by Fig. 3c. The ﬁgure shows that there is a strong volatility regarding the risk condition in
the Chinese banking sector over the period 2003–2006, while during 2007–2011, the risk condition in the Chinese banking
sector is relatively more stable. The stronger volatility over the period 2003–2006 can be explained by the capital injection
initiated by the Chinese government to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) which hinders the competition and leads to
higher risk taken by banks (especially state-owned commercial banks), while during 2007–2011, a number of regulations
and supervisions took effect, such as RMB  business being fully opened to foreign-funded banks, entry requirements being
relaxed for new type rural ﬁnancial institutions, which precedes an increase in competition and more stable environment
in the banking sector. This is in line with the competition–stability hypothesis.
Table 3 shows the proﬁtability conditions of Chinese banks over the examined period. Furthermore, the proﬁtability of
three different groups of Chinese banks is also presented. From the table we  can see that over the whole examined period,
the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have a higher proﬁtability in terms of ROA
and ROE than joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), while the NIM of city commercial banks (CCBs) is higher than joint-
stock and state-owned commercial banks. With regards to PBT, the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have the highest
proﬁtability, while the proﬁtability of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) is the lowest. The higher proﬁtability in term
of ROA and ROE in state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) can be largely attributed to the fact that the overall income
generated by the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is higher, which indicates that state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs) have advantages of engaging in more diversiﬁed activities, while the higher NIM for city commercial banks (CCBs)
suggests that city commercial banks’ business focuses on the traditional deposit-loan service.
Panel A of Table 4 presents the summary statistics for the explanatory variables of all Chinese banks, while panel B–D
report the summary statistics of the explanatory variables for state-owned, joint-stock and city commercial banks, respec-
tively. The table shows that Chinese state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have the largest size in terms of total assets,
while state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) are the most liquid banking group compared to joint-stock commercial banks
(JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs). Furthermore, city commercial banks (CCBs) have the highest capital levels, fol-
lowed by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), while the capitalization of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) is the
lowest. The level of diversiﬁed business engaged by state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is higher than joint-stock and
city commercial banks, while the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have higher labour
productivity. The lower labour productivity for state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is attributed to the fact that state-
owned commercial banks (SOCBs) are very big and difﬁcult to manage. In terms of the overhead cost among the three different
groups of Chinese banks, state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) is higher than joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and
city commercial banks (CCBs). This is attributed to the larger bank size of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).
With regards to the industry and macroeconomic environment in China, the table suggests that banking sector devel-
opment, inﬂation and GDP growth in China are more stable than stock market development over the examined period.
The higher volatility of the Chinese stock market can be mainly attributed to the share segregation reform initiated by the
Chinese government in 2005, which leads to a substantial amount of companies being listed on the stock exchange. By the
end of 2007, there were 1550 listed companies in the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchange, the value of which reached
RBM 32.71 billion, and accounting for 132.6% of GDP at the same year. On the other hand, the stock market development
was in its early stage before 2005.
5.2. Methodology
During recent years, a number of research articles use different methods to investigate the competitive condition in
the banking industry (see Al-Muharrami et al., 2006; Matthews et al., 2007; Jeon et al., 2011; Olivero et al., 2011; Tabak
et al., 2012; Cipollini and Fiordelisi, 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; Fu et al., 2014; among others). To be more speciﬁc,
the competition in GCC banking system over the period 1993–2002 is estimated by Al-Muharrami et al., 2006, using three
different indicators, namely K-bank concentration ratio, Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index as well as the Panzar–Rosse H statistic;
while the Panzar–Rosse H statistic is used by Matthews et al. (2007) to investigate the competitive condition of British banks
over the period 1980 to 2004. The Panzar–Rosse H statistic is used by Jeon et al., 2011 to evaluate the competitive condition
of the Asia and Latin America banking sector over the period 1997–2008. Olivero et al., 2011 assess the competitive condition
of the Asian and Latin American banking sector over the period 1996–2006 under the Panzar–Rosse H statistic; the Boone
indicator is used by Tabak et al., 2011 to investigate the competition of Latin American banking industry during 2003 and
2008; Cipollini and Fiordelisi (2012) use Lerner index as well as Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index to examine to competitive
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Table 3
Descriptive statistics for proﬁtability measures (ROA, ROE, NIM and PBT) by ownership type.
Panel A: All banks Panel B: SOCBs Panel C: JSCBs Panel D: CCBs
Obs Mean Min Max  SD Obs Mean Min  Max  SD Obs Mean Min  Max  SD Obs Mean Min  Max SD
ROA 331 0.008 −0.04 0.24 0.005 45 0.008 0.002 0.014 0.003 98 0.006 −0.04 0.013 0.006 188 0.008 −0.001 0.024 0.005
ROE  339 0.095 −14.52 0.4 0.8 46 0.14 −0.06 0.251 0.076 98 −0.02 −14.52 0.3 1.49 195 0.14 −0.017 0.4 0.074
NIM  341 2.81 0.54 8.05 1 46 2.57 1.05 3.29 0.45 102 2.48 0.68 3.42 0.47 193 3.04 0.54 8.05 1.22
PBT  347 0.012 −0.003 0.035 0.006 46 0.013 0.002 0.02 0.005 106 0.01 −0.003 0.019 0.004 195 0.012 0.002 0.035 0.007
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Table 4
Summary statistics: explanatory variables.
Panel A: all banks Panel B: SOCBs Panel C: JSCBs Panel D: CCBs
Obs Mean Min Max SD Obs Mean Min Max SD Obs Mean Min Max SD Obs Mean Min Max SD
Banks size 349 5.15 3.43 7.19 0.94 46 6.73 5.97 7.19 0.28 106 5.7 4.01 7.19 0.5 197 4.49 3.43 5.98 0.5
LLPTL 332 0.008 −0.0004 0.03 0.005 46 0.006 0.002 0.01 0.003 101 0.007 0.0004 0.03 0.004 185 0.009 −0.0004 0.03 0.01
Z-score 421 1245.6 −2956 11080.6 1369 49 1253 −2956 7111 1583.4 118 722.3 −58.6 4653 606 254 1487 0 11080 1511
Stability
inefﬁciency
369 0.33 0.025 0.789 0.23 45 0.33 0.025 0.789 0.23 99 0.33 0.03 0.79 0.23 225 0.33 0.03 0.79 0.23
liquidity 349 53.45 18.56 77.58 8.72 46 51.77 43 64 5.56 106 56.09 32.5 68.4 6.65 197 52.41 18.6 77.6 9.9
Capitalization 349 4.96 −14 14.63 2.63 46 4.27 −14 7.75 4.63 106 4.06 −1 14 1.95 197 5.6  1.71 14.6 2.09
Taxation 345 0.4 −0.39 2.84 0.23 46 0.39 0.149 0.93 0.18 104 0.46 −0.39 2.84 0.34 195 0.37 0.11 1.51 0.16
Diversiﬁcation 345 13.02 −12.94 74.3 13.08 46 16.44 5.4 43.3 8.1 104 10.03 −12.94 34 6.81 195 13.8  −2.62 74.3 16
Overhead 330 0.01 0.005 0.03 0.003 46 0.11 0.009 0.014 0.001 104 0.01 0.005 0.02 0.002 180 0.01 0.006 0.03 0.003
Labour pro-
ductivity
258  0.01 0.001 0.03 0.005 45 0.007 0.001 0.014 0.003 89 0.01 0.003 0.03 0.004 124 0.01 0.002 0.03 0.005
Lerner index 228 0.18 0.003 0.92 0.15 40 0.23 0.05 0.92 0.13 59 0.1 0.003 0.33 0.16 129 0.2 0.014 0.49 0.14
Herﬁndahl
index
369 0.015 0.011 0.03 0.006
Banking
sector
develop-
ment
369 2.13 1.98 2.4 0.17
Stock market
develop-
ment
392 70.62 24.31 184.1 46.46
Inﬂation 393 2.8 −0.77 5.86 2.16
GDP growth 369 10.74 9.1 14.2 1.61
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ondition of a sample of European banks over the period 1996–2009; Fungacova et al. (2014) use Lerner index to examine
he competitive condition for a sample of banks from 12 Euro area countries over the period 2002–2010, while both the
hree-bank concentration ratio as well as Lerner index are used by Fu et al. (2014) to evaluate the competition in the Asian
aciﬁc banking industry over the period 2003–2010.
Although there are a number of researchers using the Panar-Rosse H statistic to investigate the competition in the banking
ector, it mainly suffers from two drawbacks. First, as argued by Leuvensteijn et al. (2011), the H statistic was  developed on
he basis of a static model, and there are no predictions on the H-statistic which is one of the weaknesses of this test. In other
ords, the estimate is surrounded by a degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, as argued by Claessens and Laeven (2004), the
verall market equilibrium required by the test cannot be fulﬁlled because of market entry and exit, which leads to further
imits on the interpretation of such analysis.
Furthermore, the Boone indicator also suffers from two  disadvantages. First, as argued by Tabak et al. (2012) it makes the
ssumption that part of the efﬁciency gains achieved by the banks will be passed onto consumers. In addition, this indicator
lso suffers from idiosyncratic variation, i.e. uncertainty.
The Lerner index is used in this study mainly because of the following reasons: (1) it can be easily estimated by each bank
t each year; and also it matches with its determinants, which are bank-level variables at each year; (2) we  can estimate the
ompetitive conditions (market power) for three different ownership types of Chinese banks. Moreover, compared between
he K-bank concentration ratio and Herﬁndahl–Hirchman index, the latter is preferred and used in the current study due to
he fact that it takes into account the relative size of the ﬁrms in an industry.
.2.1. Estimation of bank competition
.2.1.1. Lerner index. The Lerner index is deﬁned as the difference between a bank’s price and the marginal cost, divided
y the price. The index value ranges from a maximum of 1 to a minimum of zero, with higher numbers indicating greater
arket power and hence less competition. The Lerner index represents the extent to which a particular bank has market
ower to set its price above the marginal cost.
The price is computed by estimating the average price of bank production (proxied by total assets) as the ratio of total
evenue over total assets following Fernandez de Guevara et al. (2005), Carbo et al. (2009a,b) and others. The marginal cost is
stimated on the basis of a translog cost function with one output (total assets) and three input prices (price of labour, price
f capital and price of funds). Symmetry and linear homogeneity restrictions in input prices are imposed. The cost function
s speciﬁed as
LNCOSTit = ˛0 + ˛1LNASSETSit +
1
2
˛2(LNASSETSit)
2 +
3∑
j=1
ˇitjLNINPUTitj+
3∑
j=1
3∑
k=1
ˇitjkLNINPUTitjLNINPUTitk +
3∑
j=1
itjLNASSETSitLNINPUTitj + εit
(2)
here LN denotes the natural logarithm, COST denotes total cost, i and t indicate the speciﬁc bank operating at the speciﬁc
ear; ASSETS represents the total assets, INPUT represents the three input prices used in the current study and different
nput prices are represented by the subscripts j and k: INPUT1 is the price of funds (ratio of interest expenses to total
unding), INPUT2 indicates the price of capital (ratio of other non-interest expenses to ﬁxed assets), INPUT3 stands for the
rice of labour (ratio of personnel expenses to total assets). ˛0 and ε stand for the constant and error terms, respectively.
he estimated coefﬁcients of the cost function are then used to compute the marginal cost (MC).
MCit =
COSTit
ASSETSit
⎛
⎝aˆ1 + aˆ2LNY +
3∑
j=1
ˆitjLNINPUTitj
⎞
⎠ (3)
Once the marginal cost is estimated and the price of output computed, we  calculate the Lerner index for each bank and
btain a direct measure of bank competition. We  use the same three input prices to calculate the marginal cost, which are
he price of funds, price of capital and price of labour. The aˆ1, aˆ2ˆitj are the coefﬁcients estimated from Eq. (2). The deﬁnition
f the variables used to estimate the Lerner index is summarized in Table 5.
.2.1.2. Herﬁndahl–Hirchman index (HHI). The HHI sums the squared market shares of ﬁrms in the relevant market. The
elative size and distribution of the ﬁrms in a market are taken into consideration by the HHI. The value of HHI approaches
ero when there is a large number of ﬁrms with relatively similar size in the market. As the number of ﬁrms in the market
ecreases, as well as the increase in the difference in size among these ﬁrms, it leads to an increase in the value of HHI. The
alculation of HHI can be expressed as follows:HHI =
n∑
i=1
(MSi)
2 (4)
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Table 5
The deﬁnition of variables used to estimate the Lerner index.
Variable Notation Measurement
Total cost COST Interest expenses plus non-interest expenses
Total assets ASSETS
Input prices INPUT Input price 1: price of fund—ratio of interest expenses over total funding
Input price 2: price of capital—ratio of other non-interest expenses over ﬁxed
assets
Input price 3: price of labour—ratio of personnel expenses over total assets
Marginal cost MC Estimated using Eqs. (2) and (3)
where MS  is the market share of the ﬁrm and n is the number of ﬁrms in the market. Al-Muharrami et al. (2006) indicate
that this indicator assigns a greater weight to larger banks than smaller banks. In other words, it attaches importance to
the larger banks. Furthermore, each bank is incorporated individually to avoid the arbitrary cut-offs and insensitivity to the
share distribution.
5.2.2. Measurement of stability inefﬁciency
Fang et al. (2011) argue that the potential stability of banks cannot be necessarily reﬂected by the Z-score. The deviation
from the bank’s current stability and the maximum must be considered. We  provide a measure of the bank’s stability
inefﬁciency by estimating a stochastic frontier (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and Van den Broeck, 1977) with the Z-score
as the dependent variable of the translog speciﬁcation. The equation we  use to estimate the frontier can be expressed as
follows:
Ln
(
Z-score
W2
)
it
= ı0 +
∑
j
ıjLn Yjit +
1
2
∑
j
∑
k
ıjkLn YjitLn Ykit + ˇ1 Ln
(
W1
W2
)
it
+ 1
2
ˇ2Ln
(
W1
W2
)
it
+
∑
j
jLn Yjit Ln
(
W1
W2
)
it
+ it − it
(5)
where W represents the input price; we consider two  input prices which are the price of funds (interest expenses to total
deposits) and the price of capital (non-interest expenses to total assets). Y represents four outputs, which are total loans,
total deposits, other earning assets and non-interest income. The sub-index i and t represent bank i operates at time t, while
j and k represent different output. The error term εit equals it − it. The ﬁrst term it captures the random disturbance,
which is assumed to be normally distributed and represents the measurement errors and other uncontrolled factors, i.e.
it∼N(0, 	2 ). The second term it captures the technical and allocative inefﬁciency, both under managerial control, and we
assume it to be half-normally distributed, i. e. itN+(it, 	2). Higher stability inefﬁciency indicates that the bank risk is
higher, while lower stability inefﬁciency means that the bank is more stable.
5.2.3. Method to investigate the determinants of bank proﬁtability in China
Empirical literature uses a variety of methods to investigate the determinants of bank proﬁtability. Fixed effects is used
by Suﬁan (2009) to investigate the determinants of bank proﬁtability in China. More recent research undertaken by Tan and
Floros (2012a–c) use Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)  difference and system estimators (one-step and two-step) to
investigate the determinants of Chinese bank proﬁtability.
GMM  estimator is used in the current study due to the fact that a number of problems in estimating the determinants
of bank proﬁtability including endogeneity, unobserved heterogeneity, autocorrelation and proﬁt persistence cannot be
solved by ﬁxed effects. To be more speciﬁc, comparing between difference and system GMM  estimators, we  prefer the latter
because the system GMM  estimator addresses the issue of unit root property and produces more precise results (Bond,
2002), while compared to two-step GMM  estimator, the one-step estimator is chosen due to the fact that it produces a
smaller bias and a smaller standard deviation of the estimation (Judson and Owen, 1999). Besides using the one period lag of
proﬁtability indicators, through the Sargan over-identifying test, we conﬁrm that the capital will be treated as endogenous
variable, while one of the risk indicators (the ratio of loan loss provisions over total loans) will be treated as predetermined
variable, other variables do not suffer any endogenous issue. In order to make sure there is no second order autocorrelation
in the estimation, the predetermined variable is instrumented using levels lagged by one year period, while the endogenous
variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  years periods.
6. Empirical results
Table 6 reports the empirical results of the impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability in China using stability
inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator. The F-statistic shows the joint signiﬁcance of the
variables, while the Sargan test shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Even though the equations indicate that
ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that the estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied
if second-order autocorrelation was present (Arellano and Bond, 1991), but this case is rejected by the test of AR(2) errors.
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Table  6
Empirical results (stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable 0.08** 2.24 −0.004 −1.34 0.4*** 9.31 0.34*** 5.29
Bank  characteristics
Stability inefﬁciency 0.0005 0.56 −0.009 −0.45 0.155 1.28 −0.002 1.6
Bank  size −0.001*** −2.79 0.006 0.77 −0.43*** −6.49 −0.003*** −6.10
Liquidity 0.0001* 1.92 0.0001 0.13 0.012*** 2.82 0.0001** 2.26
Taxation −0.01*** −8.37 −0.21*** −6.82 −0.05 −0.31 −0.008*** −4.20
Capitalizationa 0.00001 0.16 0.002 1.4 −0.015* −1.69 −0.0001 −0.81
Overhead cost 0.16 1.31 5.55** 2.50 109.6*** 6.17 0.44*** 2.90
Diversiﬁcation −9.34e − 06 −0.49 0.001 1.55 −0.023*** −8.07 3.56e − 06 0.13
Labour  productivity 0.4*** 6.31 4.68*** 4.52 44.64*** 5.20 0.52*** 6.80
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.004** 2.01 0.015 0.50 1.47*** 6.13 0.005** 2.32
Banking sector development 0.005*** 3.02 0.006 0.26 0.84*** 3.63 0.005*** 3.71
Stock  market development 0.00001** 2.13 0.0001 0.53 0.0003 0.38 5.36e − 06 0.83
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation 0.0004*** 4.14 0.002 1.04 0.105*** 7.96 0.0005*** 4.25
GDP  growth rate −0.0001 −0.35 0.004 1.41 0.04* 1.68 0.0006*** 3.21
Joint-stock commercial banks −0.005*** −6.16 0.009 0.61 −0.74*** −6.4 −0.007*** −6.84
City  commercial banks −0.004*** −3.66 0.012 0.63 −0.75*** −4.89 −0.008*** −6.32
F-test 199.26*** 164.29*** 1466.24*** 288.87***
Sargan1 126.66 89.84 167.62 176.85
AR(1)2 Z = −3.55 P = 0.000 Z = −1.80 P = 0.073 Z = −2.33 P = 0.02 Z = −3.79 P = 0.000
AR(2)3 Z = −0.05 P = 0.963 Z = −0.88 P = 0.381 Z = −1.58 P = 0.115 Z = 0.62 P = 0.533
No.  of observations 121 171 121 174
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2
m
w
m
c
n
c
e
P
r
r
i
i
p
T
b
e
C
i
t
T
t
h
cArellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
The signiﬁcant coefﬁcients of the lagged dependent variables (ROA, NIM and PBT) conﬁrm the dynamic character of
odel speciﬁcation. ı takes values of 0.08, 0.4 and 0.34 when proﬁtability is measured by ROA, NIM and PBT, respectively,
hich shows that the proﬁtability of Chinese banks does not persist, it implies that departure from a perfectly competitive
arket structure in the Chinese banking sector is not very large. In other words, the Chinese banking sector has a relatively
ompetitive structure.
Turning to other explanatory variables, the coefﬁcient of bank size is signiﬁcant and negative, suggesting that there is a
egative impact of bank size on ROA, NIM and PBT. This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that the smaller banks, such as
ity commercial banks (CCBs), are easier to be managed and bank managers can concentrate on a smaller number of business
ngaged, which leads to a higher proﬁtability. Liquidity is found to be signiﬁcantly and negatively related to ROA, NIM and
BT; this result indicates that higher degree of loan exposure (lower liquidity) leads to an increase in bank proﬁtability. It
eﬂects the fact that Chinese banks have the ability to monitor and manage the loans very well, and the subsequent cost
eduction leads to an increase in bank proﬁtability.
We  ﬁnd that taxation has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on ROA, ROE and PBT of Chinese commercial banks. The result
ndicates that large volume of taxes reduces Chinese bank proﬁtability. This ﬁnding is in line with Tan and Floros (2012a–c)
n the Chinese banking industry. We  further notice that overhead cost is highly signiﬁcant and positively related to bank
roﬁtability with regards to ROE, NIM and PBT; this is in line with Tan and Floros (2012a) for the Chinese banking sector.
he signiﬁcant and negative impact of diversiﬁcation on bank proﬁtability (NIM) suggests that higher level of diversiﬁed
usiness precedes a decline in bank proﬁtability. This result can be explained by the fact that a larger variety of business
ngaged by banks reduces the volume of funds available for traditional loan business, which precedes a decline in NIM.
oncerning the impact of labour productivity, it is positively and signiﬁcantly related to proﬁtability of Chinese banks,
ndicating a positive relationship between bank proﬁtability and labour productivity. Labour productivity is measured by
he total revenue generated by a member of staff; a higher ﬁgure indicates higher revenue generated and higher proﬁtability.
his is in line with Athanasoglou et al. (2008) for Greek banks.
The Lerner index has signiﬁcant and positive signs for ROA, NIM and PBT of Chinese commercial banks, indicating that
here is a negative impact of competition on bank proﬁtability. This is in line with the structure–conduct–performance (SCP)
ypothesis.
The banking sector development is found to be signiﬁcantly and positively related to ROA, NIM and PBT of Chinese
ommercial banks. This is in line with our expectation. The sign of stock market development is positive and this variable is
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Table 7
Empirical results (stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Herﬁndahl index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable 0.07 1.52 −0.002 −0.71 0.37*** 5.90 0.21*** 2.88
Bank  characteristics
Stability inefﬁciency 0.001 0.89 0.01 0.47 −0.04 −0.22 −0.001 −0.74
Bank  size −0.0004 −0.75 −0.003 −0.38 −0.29*** −3.43 −0.002*** −4.44
Liquidity 0.00002 0.73 −0.001 −1.01 0.012* 1.97 0.0001** 2.49
Taxation −0.005*** −7.44 −0.13*** −7.33 −0.22* −1.81 −0.006*** −5.85
Capitalizationa 0.00001 0.04 −0.008 −1.63 0.08 1.26 −0.0001 −0.25
Overhead cost 0.2 1.20 7.00*** 2.87 89.67*** 2.87 0.4*** 3.18
Diversiﬁcation −0.00002 −1.20 0.0004 1.15 −0.02*** −6.67 1.65e − 06 0.08
Labour productivity 0.33*** 3.94 5.57*** 5.01 40.94** 2.58 0.57*** 8.87
Industry characteristics
Herﬁndahl index −0.08 −1.59 −0.76 −0.47 −0.34 −0.04 −0.12* −1.82
Banking sector development 0.004** 2.16 0.06** 2.02 0.41 1.39 0.005*** 3.12
Stock  market development 0.00001** 2.08 0.0001 1.52 −0.001 −0.53 5.02E − 06 0.93
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation 0.0003*** 3.58 0.002 1.21 0.09*** 5.10 0.0003*** 3.92
GDP  growth rate −0.0002 −1.39 0.002 0.93 0.07*** 2.85 0.0005*** 3.64
Joint-stock commercial banks −0.004*** −4.39 −0.008 −0.49 −0.7*** −4.07 −0.007*** −8.27
City  commercial banks −0.002* −1.69 0.0004 0.02 −0.56*** −2.96 −0.006*** −5.43
F-test 198.62*** 172.20*** 900.43*** 427.6***
Sargan1 5.24 26.74 8.22 22.94
AR(1)2 Z = −2.86 P = 0.004 Z = −3.35 P = 0.001 Z = −2.51 P = 0.012 Z = −5.00 P = 0.000
AR(2)3 Z = −1.06 P = 0.289 Z = −0.98 P = 0.328 Z = −1.18 P = 0.239 Z = 1.01 P = 0.313
No.  of observations 163 226 164 321
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
signiﬁcant, indicating that there is a positive relationship between stock market development and bank proﬁtability (ROA).
This ﬁnding conﬁrms the empirical results of Ben Naceur (2003) for Tunisian banks.
Turing to the macroeconomic variables, inﬂation is found to be signiﬁcantly and positively related to bank proﬁtability
(ROA, NIM and PBT). This result indicates that during the examined period, the inﬂation is fully anticipated by Chinese banks,
so the bank regulatory authorities and bank managers adjust the interest rates accordingly. Furthermore, it also reﬂects that
Chinese bank managers manage the expenses very well during this period, which leads to an increase in bank proﬁtability.
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) have the same ﬁnding for the EU banking industry as well as Suﬁan (2009), Garcia-Herrero
et al. (2009) for the Chinese banking industry. The ﬁndings further suggest that GDP has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on
NIM and PBT of Chinese commercial banks; this result can be explained by the fact that the demand for lending increases
during the periods of economic boom, which leads to an improvement in bank proﬁtability.
With regards to the ownership dummy  variable, the ﬁndings suggest that, compared to the state-owned commercial
banks (SOCBs), the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have lower proﬁtability. This
ﬁnding is in direct contrast with the results reported by Garcia-Herrero et al. (2009) who argue that joint-stock commercial
banks (JSCbs) have higher proﬁtability, and state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) are the main drag of bank proﬁtability
in China. Our ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that, following the successful listing of Agricultural Commercial Bank of
China in 2011, all the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have been listed on Chinese stock exchanges. This increase in
the external monitoring induces the bank managers of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) to improve and enhance the
bank management; the resulting decline in cost precedes an improvement in bank proﬁtability. Furthermore, compared to
joint-stock and city commercial banks in China, Chinese state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) engage in larger volumes of
loan business, which leads to economies of scale and further reduces the cost and increase the bank proﬁtability. In addition,
a larger variety of business is engaged by Chinese state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), and the cost beneﬁt derived from
economies of scope further promotes the proﬁtability of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).
Table 7 reports the empirical results regarding the joint impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability using
stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Herﬁndahl index as competition indicator. Most of the results are in accordance
with the ﬁndings reported in Table 6. To be more speciﬁc, we ﬁnd that size is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to NIM
and PBT of Chinese banks; Chinese banks with higher liquidity have lower proﬁtability in terms of NIM and PBT; Chinese
commercial banks with higher taxes have lower proﬁtability in terms of ROA, ROE and PBT; there is a signiﬁcant and positive
relationship between overhead cost and bank proﬁtability in terms of ROE, NIM and PBT; Chinese banks with higher levels
of diversiﬁed activities have lower NIM and bank proﬁtability in China can be increased if labour productivity is improved.
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Table  8
Empirical results (Z-score as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable 0.07** 2.00 −0.004 −1.50 0.4*** 8.73 0.36*** 5.57
Bank  characteristics
Z-score −1.71e − 07 −0.77 −0.00001*** −3.43 −0.00001 −0.36 2.88e − 07 1.29
Bank  size −0.001*** −2.75 0.003 0.43 −0.43*** −6.49 −0.003*** −6.64
Liquidity 0.0001* 1.97 0.0003 0.57 0.012*** 2.65 0.0001** 2.03
Taxation −0.01*** −8.33 −0.21*** −7.06 −0.06 −0.38 −0.008*** −4.27
Capitalizationa 0.00005 0.61 0.004** 2.33 −0.01 −0.98 −0.0002 −1.65
Overhead cost 0.17 1.31 4.72** 2.16 108.01*** 5.94 0.44*** 2.99
Diversiﬁcation −4.45E − 06 −0.22 0.001* 1.83 −0.02*** −7.78 −4.66E − 06 −0.18
Labour productivity 0.4*** 6.35 4.32*** 4.23 45.32*** 5.16 0.54*** 7.16
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.004** 2.06 0.02 0.56 1.48*** 5.99 0.004** 2.26
Banking sector development 0.005*** 3.03 0.02 0.85 0.88*** 3.69 0.006*** 4.05
Stock  market development 0.00001** 2.28 0.0001 0.90 −0.0002 −0.32 8.44E − 06 1.41
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation 0.0004*** 4.08 0.002 1.30 0.105*** 7.76 0.0005*** 3.19
GDP  growth rate −0.00005 −0.34 0.003 1.15 0.05** 2.24 0.0006*** 3.19
Joint-stock commercial banks −0.005*** −6.20 0.0001 0.00 −0.76*** −6.21 −0.007*** −6.96
City  commercial banks −0.004*** −3.61 0.01 0.58 −0.77*** −4.90 −0.008*** −6.91
F-test 195.71*** 169.03*** 1396.74*** 296.4***
Sargan1 123.98 88.66 161.36 182.17
AR(1)2 Z = −3.36 P = 0.001 Z = −1.78 P = 0.074 Z = −2.23 P = 0.02 Z = −3.92 P = 0.000
AR(2)3 Z = −0.38 P = 0.702 Z = −1.00 P = 0.319 Z = −1.41 P = 0.159 Z = 0.92 P = 0.359
No.  of observations 121 171 121 174
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
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(The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
ith regards to the industry-speciﬁc variables, we  ﬁnd that higher developed banking market leads to higher proﬁtability of
hinese commercial banks in terms of ROA and PBT and higher stock market development precedes an improvement in ROA
f Chinese commercial banks. With regards to the macroeconomic variables, the results show that in a higher inﬂationary
nvironment, Chinese banks have higher ROA, NIM and PBT, while higher economic growth in China leads to higher NIM
nd PBT of Chinese banks. We  ﬁnally ﬁnd that compared to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial
anks (JSCBs) and city commercial banks (CCBs) have lower proﬁtability with regards to ROA, NIM and PBT. However, this
able shows that competition, as measured by Herﬁndahl index, has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on PBT of Chinese
ommercial banks, which is in contrast with our ﬁnding in Table 6.
Table 8 reports the empirical results regarding the impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability using Z-score as
isk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator. Compared to the results reported from Tables 6 and 7, we conﬁrm
he following ﬁndings: (1) Chinese banks with bigger size in terms of total assets have lower NIM and PBT; (2) Chinese
anks with higher liquidity have lower proﬁtability in terms of NIM and PBT; (3) there is a signiﬁcant and negative impact of
axation on Chinese bank proﬁtability in terms of ROA, ROE and PBT; (4) There is a signiﬁcant and positive impact of overhead
ost on Chinese bank proﬁtability in terms of ROE, NIM and PBT; (5) There is a signiﬁcant and negative relationship between
iversiﬁcation and NIM of Chinese banks; (6) Chinese banks with higher labour productivity have higher proﬁtability; (7)
he banking sector development has a positive and signiﬁcant impact on ROA and PBT of Chinese banks; (8) Higher stock
arket development leads to higher ROA of Chinese commercial banks; (9) Inﬂation has a signiﬁcant and positive impact
n ROA, NIM and PBT of Chinese commercial banks; (10) higher economic growth leads to higher NIM and PBT of Chinese
ommercial banks. Finally, the results conﬁrm that joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks have lower
roﬁtability compared to state-owned commercial banks.
Table 9 reports the empirical results regarding the impacts of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability using LLPTL as
isk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator. The following ﬁndings are in accordance with the results reported
rom Tables 6–8: (1) Bigger Chinese banks in terms of total assets have lower proﬁtability in terms of NIM and PBT; (2) More
iquid Chinese banks have lower NIM and PBT; (3) higher volumes of tax reduce Chinese bank proﬁtability in terms of ROA,
OE and PBT; (4) Chinese banks with higher volumes of overhead costs have higher ROE, NIM and PBT; (5) Chinese banks
ith higher levels of diversiﬁed activities have lower NIM; (6) There is signiﬁcant and positive impact of labour productivity
n bank proﬁtability; (7) Higher developed banking sector contributes to the proﬁtability improvement of Chinese banks
ith regards to ROA and PBT; (8) Chinese bank proﬁtability (ROA, NIM and PBT) is higher when there is a higher inﬂation,
9) higher economic growth leads to higher PBT of Chinese commercial banks. Finally, the ﬁndings of this table conﬁrm
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Table 9
Empirical results (LLPTL as risk indicator and the Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable 0.096*** 3.12 −0.004 −1.40 0.37*** 8.99 0.36*** 5.79
Bank  characteristics
LLPTLa 0.16*** −5.32 −0.72 −1.01 24.94*** 5.85 −0.14*** −3.05
Bank  size −0.002*** −4.65 0.004 0.61 −0.35*** −5.58 −0.003*** −7.14
Liquidity 0.00003 1.16 0.0001 0.21 0.015*** 3.69 0.0001** 2.22
Taxation −0.009*** −8.46 −0.2*** −6.66 −0.24 −1.51 −0.008*** −3.92
Capitalization◦ −4.76e − 06 −0.08 0.002 1.41 −0.01 −1.23 −0.0001 −1.16
Overhead cost 0.23** 2.10 5.48** 2.36 98.61*** 5.94 0.55*** 3.68
Diversiﬁcation −5.09e − 06 −0.30 0.001* 1.70 −0.02*** −9.20 7.82e − 06 0.31
Labour productivity 0.43*** 7.82 4.75*** 4.61 41.68*** 5.18 0.55*** 7.45
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.005*** 3.31 0.02 0.57 1.21*** 5.27 0.004** 2.34
Banking sector development 0.008*** 4.69 0.007 0.33 0.69*** 3.13 0.006*** 4.14
Stock  market development 3.68e − 06 0.76 0.00005 0.54 0.001 1.21 6.03e − 06 1.02
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation 0.0006*** 5.92 0.002 1.19 0.087*** 6.81 0.0005*** 4.70
GDP  growth rate 0.0001 0.88 0.004 1.47 0.03 1.56 0.0006*** 3.38
Joint-stock commercial banks −0.006*** −7.57 0.007 0.52 −0.72*** −6.58 −0.007*** −7.61
City  commercial banks −0.005*** −5.11 0.011 0.62 −0.67*** −4.63 −0.008*** −6.95
F-test 261.06*** 163.7*** 1656.19*** 313.95***
Sargan1 134.21 91.84 154.06 188.37
AR(1)2 Z = −3.00 P = 0.003 Z = −1.68 P = 0.093 Z = −2.48 P = 0.013 Z = −3.49 P = 0.000
AR(2)3 Z = −1.16 P = 0.244 Z = −0.91 P = 0.363 Z = −0.90 P = 0.366 Z = 0.64 P = 0.525
No.  of observations 121 170 121 173
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The predetermined variable is instrumented using levels lagged by one period.
◦ The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
that, compared to the state-owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks and city commercial banks have lower
proﬁtability in terms of ROA, NIM and PBT.
Using stability inefﬁciency as the risk indicator and Lerner index as the competition indicator, Tables 10–12 show the
impacts of competition and risk on bank proﬁtability for different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks, starting
from the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Table 10 shows that stability inefﬁciency has a signiﬁcant and positive
impact on NIM, which suggests that higher insolvency risk leads to higher NIM of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).
Insolvency risk in banking measures the degree or the probability that a bank can no longer meet its ﬁnancial obligation
with its depositors. State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) can excessively use the depositors fund to make loans due to
the fact that government provides full support when necessary, thus, large volume of loans made by the banks increase the
insolvency risk; however, it leads to an increase in the NIM of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). Furthermore, the table
shows that large state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have higher NIM, as reﬂected by signiﬁcant and positive sign of this
variable, higher NIM of larger state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) can be explained from the economies of scale as well
as economies of scope. In addition, the table shows that higher liquidity leads to higher PBT of state-owned commercial banks
(SOCBs). This can be explained by the fact that a large number of loans in assets (lower liquidity) increases the proportion
of non-performing loans, because of the support from government, the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) have less
incentive and effort to monitor the loans and this leads to a decline in PBT of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs).
Compared to Tables 6–9, Table 10 also conﬁrms a number of ﬁndings: (1) taxation has signiﬁcant and negative impact on
ROA and ROE; (2) overhead cost has signiﬁcant and positive impact on ROE and NIM; (3) diversiﬁcation has a signiﬁcant
and negative impact on NIM; (4) labour productivity has signiﬁcant and positive impact on ROE, NIM and PBT. Finally, the
table shows that a higher developed stock market leads to higher NIM of state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs). This can
be explained by the fact that a well-developed stock market provides valuable information to the banks about companies’
credit situation, and this information substantially reduces the cost of monitoring risk and further leads to an increase in
NIM.
Table 11 shows the results with regards to the joint impacts of competition and risk on proﬁtability of Chinese joint-stock
commercial banks (JSCBs). The ﬁndings show that large joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) have higher proﬁtability with
regards to ROE and PBT. This ﬁnding can also be explained by the fact that larger joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs)
beneﬁt from economies of scale as well economies of scope. The table further reports that higher liquidity leads to lower
ROA of joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs). This can be explained by the fact that non-interest income generating activities
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Table  10
Empirical results for state-owned commercial banks (stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of
dependent variable
−0.09 −0.56 −0.02 −0.25 0.055 0.43 0.15 0.89
Bank  characteristics
Stability inefﬁciency −0.001 −0.52 −0.002 −0.09 0.34** 2.38 0.0001 0.06
Bank  size 0.03 1.62 0.03 1.56 0.56** 2.63 0.003 1.69
Liquidity 0.16 −0.0002 −0.19 0.003 0.32 −0.0002** −2.33
Taxation −0.01*** −3.90 −0.22*** −4.40 −0.21 −0.89 0.003 1.05
Capitalizationa 0.00002 0.17 0.008*** 5.14 −0.02* −1.93 −0.0004*** −3.82
Overhead cost −0.08 −0.18 7.43* 1.77 165.67*** 3.98 0.11 0.39
Diversiﬁcation −0.0001 −0.92 −0.003** −2.46 −0.05*** −4.56 0.00003 0.36
Labour productivity 0.71 1.63 7.7* 1.91 110.11** 2.70 1.2*** 3.30
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.01** 2.39 0.12 1.50 1.09** 2.13 0.02*** 3.46
Banking sector
development
−0.007 −0.87 −0.006 −0.10 −1.33 −1.68 −0.008 −1.66
Stock  market
development
3.98E − 07 0.03 0.0001 0.77 0.004** 2.49 0.00001 1.16
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation −0.0001 −0.31 −0.002 −0.83 −0.01 −0.28 −0.0003 −1.38
GDP  growth rate −0.00003 −0.08 −0.009* −1.93 −0.07 −1.75 0.0003 0.72
F-test  90.65*** 92.69*** 958.83*** 180.63***
Sargan1 36.61 30.66 28.92 35.31
AR(1)2 Z = −0.01 P = 0.996 Z = −0.84 P = 0.399 Z = −165 P = 0.099 Z = −0.94 P = 0.347
AR(2)3 Z = −1.61 P = 0.108 Z = −0.09 P = 0.929 Z = 1.45 P = 0.146 Z = −1.60 P = 0.110
No.  of observations 29 36 29 36
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
Table 11
Empirical results for joint-stock commercial banks (stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable −0.04 −1.05 −0.001 −0.46 0.25* 1.85 0.006 0.05
Bank  characteristics
Stability inefﬁciency −0.0002 −0.26 −0.009 −0.36 0.02 0.13 −0.001 −0.95
Bank  size 0.001 1.02 0.024* 1.87 −0.18 −1.11 0.002** 2.14
Liquidity −0.0001* −1.93 0.002 1.64 0.012 1.02 −0.0001 −0.99
Taxation −0.014*** −6.13 −0.41*** −5.62 −0.41 −0.96 −0.012*** −3.10
Capitalizationa 0.0001 0.39 −0.02*** −5.09 0.005 0.19 0.0006*** 2.81
Overhead cost 0.24 1.34 −4.18 −0.96 78.64** 2.31 −0.02 −0.09
Diversiﬁcation 0.0001 0.92 0.001 0.56 −0.005 −0.47 0.0001* 1.89
Labour  productivity 0.23*** 2.87 1.23 0.76 33.83** 2.34 0.11 1.36
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.004* 2.02 −0.014 −0.35 0.93** 2.31 0.004* 2.00
Banking sector development 0.001 0.45 0.03 0.83 0.2 0.54 −0.001 −0.82
Stock  market development −8.71e − 06 −0.86 −0.0001 −0.46 −0.001 −0.49 −8.97e − 06 −1.36
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation −0.00001 −0.09 0.003 1.2 0.09*** 4.44 0.0001 0.60
GDP  growth rate 0.0004 1.4 0.01** 2.03 0.05 0.89 0.0007*** 2.97
F-test  157.88*** 117.73*** 664.16*** 263.6***
Sargan1 60.92 64.02 48.1 63.88
AR(1)2 Z = −0.96 P = 0.335 Z = −0.68 P = 0.497 Z = −0.91 P = 0.361 Z = −0.83 P = 0.405
AR(2)3 Z = −0.81 P = 0.416 Z = −0.40 P = 0.688 Z = −0.59 P = 0.558 Z = −0.77 P = 0.440
No.  of observations 35 50 35 53
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
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Table 12
Empirical results for city commercial banks (stability inefﬁciency as risk indicator and Lerner index as competition indicator).
ROA ROE NIM PBT
Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic Coefﬁcient t-Statistic
One period lag of dependent variable 0.21 1.43 0.19** 2.41 0.4*** 4.56 0.06 0.5
Bank  characteristics
Stability inefﬁciency −0.001 −0.23 −0.06* −1.92 −0.03 −0.08 −0.004 −1.10
Bank  size −0.002* −1.76 −0.04*** −3.96 −0.65*** −4.10 −0.004*** −4.56
Liquidity 0.0001 0.90 0.001 0.72 0.02** 2.34 0.0001 1.11
Taxation −0.009*** −3.40 −0.17*** −5.26 0.006 0.02 −0.009*** −3.03
Capitalizationa 0.00004 0.09 −0.02*** −5.56 −0.03 −0.48 0.001*** 2.94
Overhead cost 0.16 0.62 4.64* 1.94 97.86*** 3.02 0.56** 2.35
Diversiﬁcation 0.00001 0.29 0.0003 0.64 −0.02*** −3.75 0.00004 0.82
Labour productivity 0.45** 2.61 5.54*** 4.32 62.77*** 3.49 0.87*** 6.30
Industry characteristics
Lerner index 0.0002 0.05 0.04 0.98 1.5*** 3.05 0.004 0.96
Banking sector development 0.005 1.24 0.13*** 4.52 0.92** 2.03 0.002 0.68
Stock  market development 0.00002 0.88 0.0002 1.2 −0.001 −0.63 8.77e − 06 0.67
Macroeconomics
Inﬂation 0.0005** 2.04 0.007*** 3.69 0.11*** 4.24 0.0005** 2.48
GDP  growth rate −0.0001 −0.32 0.004 1.26 0.02 0.49 0.0006 1.65
F-test  38.94*** 121.51*** 411.89*** 109.37***
Sargan1 35.47 51.17 87.63 44.45
AR(1)2 Z = −2.34 P = 0.019 Z = 3.12 P = 0.002 Z = −1.76 P = 0.079 Z = −2.92 P = 0.003
AR(2)3 Z = 0.81 P = 0.417 Z = 1.5 P = 0.134 Z = −1.31 P = 0.191 Z = 0.50 P = 0.614
No.  of observations 57 85 57 85
*, ** and *** denote signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
a The endogenous variable is instrumented using levels lagged by two  periods.
1 The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM  dynamic model estimation.
2 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
3 Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (H0: no autocorrelation).
engaged by joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) contribute more than the traditional loan services to the overall income of
joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), large volume of loan business reduces the volumes of funds for joint-stock commercial
banks (JSCBs) to engage in other activities, which leads to a decline in ROA. This table provides support to the results as found
by Tables 6–10 as follows: (1) taxation has signiﬁcant and negative impacts on ROA and ROE; (2) overhead cost and labour
productivity have signiﬁcant and positive impact on NIM.
The impacts of competition and risk on proﬁtability of city commercial banks (CCBs) are reported in Table 12. The
table shows that stability inefﬁciency has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on ROE, which indicates that higher insolvency
risk reduces the proﬁtability of city commercial banks (CCBs). Furthermore, we notice that bank size is signiﬁcantly and
negatively related to proﬁtability of Chinese city commercial banks (CCBs). This can be explained by the fact that smaller city
commercial banks (CCBs) normally operate within the city where they were found; however, larger city commercial banks
(CCBs) have branches in other cities as well. The local city government provides support and give beneﬁcial policies (i.e. tax
reductions) to their own city commercial banks (CCBs), while city commercial banks (CCBs) from other cities do not have this
cost advantage, and the resulting increase in cost leads to a decline in bank proﬁtability. Liquidity is found to be signiﬁcantly
and negatively related to NIM of city commercial banks (CCBs), indicating a large volume of loans leads to improvement
in NIM of city commercial banks (CCBs). This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that city commercial banks (CCBs) have
higher ability of loan monitoring and credit checking. This table also has similar ﬁndings compared to the previous tables
which are: (1) taxation has signiﬁcant and negative impacts on ROA and ROE; (2) overhead cost and labour productivity
have signiﬁcant and positive impact on NIM. We  noticed that diversiﬁcation has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on NIM of
city commercial banks (CCBs). This can be explained by the fact that loan business is still the focus for city commercial banks
(CCBs), and more diversiﬁed activities reduces the volumes of funds available for making loans, which further precedes a
decline in banks’ NIM.
7. Discussion on the empirical results for Chinese banking industry
Table 13 provides a summary for the empirical results using different risk and competition indicators across various prof-
itability measurements. Starting from single proﬁtability measurement, we  ﬁnd that one period lagged ROA is signiﬁcantly
and positively related to the current ROA (except for the case when Herﬁndahl index is used as the competitor indicator).
The results indicate that the proﬁtability of Chinese banks tends to be persistent to some extent and it conﬁrms our correct
choice of dynamic model in the empirical analysis. We  further report that the taxation is signiﬁcantly and negatively related
to ROA of Chinese banks. This can be explained by the fact that higher taxes paid by banks increase the non-interest expenses,
which further precedes a decline in bank proﬁtability. Labour productivity, which is another signiﬁcant variable in terms of
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Table 13
Summary of empirical results for different proﬁtability, risk and competition indicators.
ROA ROE NIM PBT
+ − Insigniﬁcant Inconsistent + − Insigniﬁcant Inconsistent + − Insigniﬁcant Inconsistent + − Insigniﬁcant Inconsistent
Lag
√ √ √ √
BSV
Size
√ √ √ √
Risk
√ √ √ √
Liquid
√ √ √ √
Tax
√ √ √ √
Cap
√ √ √ √
Cost
√  √ √ √
DIV
√ √ √ √
LP
√ √ √ √
ISV
Comp
√  √ √ √
BSD
√ √ √ √
SMD
√ √ √ √
Mac
INF
√  √ √ √
GDP
√  √ √ √
JSCBs
√ √ √ √
CCBs
√ √ √ √
Lag represent the lag of dependent variable; BSV stands for bank-speciﬁc variables which include Size (bank size); Risk (bank risk); Liquid (bank liquidity); Tax (bank taxation); Cap (capitalization); Cost (overhead
cost);  DIV (diversiﬁcation); LP (labour productivity); ISV is the industry-speciﬁc variables which include Comp (competition); BSD (banking sector development); SMD  (stock market development); Mac  is the
macroeconomic variables considered in the study which include INF (inﬂation) and GDP (annual GDP growth rate). “+” Represents that the variable is signiﬁcantly and positively affect the bank proﬁtability;
“−”  indicates that the variable is signiﬁcantly and negatively affect the bank proﬁtability; “insigniﬁcant” means that the variable is not signiﬁcantly related to bank proﬁtability; “inconsistent” underlines that
different results are obtained for different indicators being used.
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ROA, is found to be positively related to bank proﬁtability. This ﬁnding indicates that Chinese banks should provide more
training and professional opportunities to the staffs in order to increase their productivity and further improve proﬁtabil-
ity. In addition, Chinese banks should also recruit more staffs with higher productivity. In terms of the industry-speciﬁc
variables, it is found that banking sector development is signiﬁcantly and positively related to ROA of Chinese banks.
When using ROE as the proﬁtability indicator, the results conﬁrm the ﬁndings that higher taxes paid by banks leads
to lower proﬁtability, while banks with higher labour productivity have higher proﬁtability. In addition, the results show
that banks with higher overhead cost leads to higher bank proﬁtability. This ﬁnding can be explained by the fact that the
Chinese banks have the ability to transfer operational cost to the depositors; the resulting reduction in cost and increase in
income promote the improvement in bank proﬁtability. This ﬁnding also indicates that higher salaries paid to staff, especially
experienced staff, signiﬁcantly improve the productivity, while the resulting increase in the proﬁtability is larger than the
salary cost.
With regards to NIM, one period lag of NIM is signiﬁcant for all the cases which indicates that the NIM of Chinese
commercial banks at the current year is signiﬁcantly affected by the situation at the previous year. Furthermore, the values
of one period lagged NIM are less than 0.4, which indicates that Chinese bank proﬁtability does not persist to a large extent.
In other words, it is relatively competitive in the Chinese banking industry. Compared to ROE, we also ﬁnd that banks with
high overhead cost and labour productivity have higher proﬁtability, while the results report that large banks have lower
proﬁtability. This can be explained by the fact that larger volumes of funds are used by larger banks to engage in diversiﬁed
activities, while the reduction in the volumes of funds for traditional services further precedes a decline in bank proﬁtability
(NIM). In addition, the liquidity variable is signiﬁcant and positive for all the cases indicating lower liquidity (higher volumes
of loans) leads to higher proﬁtability. This ﬁnding shows that in general, Chinese banks have improved their ability and skills
in credit checking, monitoring and managing loans, which leads to an improvement in bank proﬁtability. The diversiﬁcation
is found to be signiﬁcant and negative for all the cases, indicating the larger variety of business engaged by banks reduces
the NIM. This can be explained by the fact more diversiﬁed business engaged by the banks reduces the volumes of funds
available for traditional loan services, which further precedes a decline in bank proﬁtability. The positive and signiﬁcant
impact of inﬂation on Chinese bank proﬁtability reﬂects the fact that Chinese banks have the ability to forecast inﬂation, and
the interests rates are adjusted accordingly, the revenues increase faster than costs, which leads to higher proﬁtability.
Finally, the table conﬁrms a number of ﬁndings when using PBT as the proﬁtability indicator, which can be summarized as
follows: (1) the proﬁtability of Chinese commercial banks tends to be persistent to some extent as reﬂected by the signiﬁcant
one period lagged dependent variable; (2) larger bank have lower proﬁtability; (3) larger volume of loans (lower liquidity)
leads to higher proﬁtability; (4) Chinese commercial banks with higher taxes have lower proﬁtability; (5) Chinese commer-
cial banks with larger volumes of overhead cost and labour productivity have higher proﬁtability; (6) higher inﬂationary
environment leads to improvement in Chinese bank proﬁtability. In addition, the results indicate that higher developed
banking sector improves Chinese bank proﬁtability, which is in line with our expectation, while higher GDP growth also has
a signiﬁcant and positive impact on Chinese bank proﬁtability. This can be explained by the fact that during the period of
economic boom, the volumes of leading increase, and the resulting increase in interest income further leads to an improve-
ment in bank proﬁtability. Table 13 shows that, compared to state-owned commercial banks, both joint-stock commercial
banks and city commercial banks have lower proﬁtability (ROA, NIM and PBT) as reﬂected by the signiﬁcant and negative
coefﬁcients.
8. Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to test the impacts of competition and risk on bank proﬁtability in China over the period
2003–2011. We  check the robustness of the results by using different risk and competition indicators. To be more spe-
ciﬁc, we use two different measurements of bank competition, which are Lerner index and Herﬁndahl-Hirschman index.
There are three alternative measurements in terms of bank risk: stability inefﬁciency, Z-score and ratio of loan loss provi-
sion over total loans. Besides the analysis on the effects of risk and competition on bank proﬁtability, we  also control for
comprehensive bank-speciﬁc, industry-speciﬁc and macroeconomic determinants of bank proﬁtability. With regards to the
econometric estimation, the one-step GMM  system estimator is applied.
The results suggest that Chinese bank proﬁtability persists to a small extent, while we  do not ﬁnd any robust impact of risk
and competition in the Chinese banking industry, the unclear impact of risk on bank proﬁtability can be attributed to the fact
that the Chinese government still have strong inﬂuence or provide strong support to Chinese banks (especially state-owned
commercial banks) through four assets management companies and capital injections. This study does not support the
traditional SCP hypothesis; this may  be explained by the fact that in the Chinese banking industry, the efﬁcient-structure
hypothesis may  be prevailing, thus, future research can be conducted, including efﬁciency as one of the determinants
to test this hypothesis. The ﬁndings further show that taxation has a signiﬁcant and negative impact on Chinese banking
proﬁtability with regards to ROA, NIM and PBT, while Chinese banks with higher labour productivity have higher proﬁtability.
In addition, the results report that Chinese banks with higher overhead cost have higher proﬁtability (ROE, NIM and PBT) and
more diversiﬁed Chinese banks have lower proﬁtability with regards to NIM. In terms of the macroeconomic environment,
the ﬁndings suggest that Chinese banks have higher proﬁtability (ROA, NIM and PBT) in a higher inﬂationary environment.
Finally, we ﬁnd that compared to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs) and city
commercial banks (CCBs) have lower ROA, NIM and PBT.
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The results with regards to the separate estimations on different ownership types of Chinese commercial banks show
hat government still has strong inﬂuence and give strong support to state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs), which to
ome extent reduces their proﬁtability, while with regards to the joint-stock commercial banks (JSCBs), it is argued that
on-interest income generating business earns higher income compared to the traditional loan services. Finally, it is found
hat large city commercial banks (CCBs) have lower proﬁtability and city commercial banks (CCBs) with higher business
iversiﬁcation have lower NIM.
The ﬁndings have several policy implications to Chinese government, regulatory authority and bank managers in order
o improve bank proﬁtability: (1) Chinese government should reduce the tax rate for commercial banks; (2) recruit more
roductive and experienced staffs and provide more training opportunities to existing staffs. With regards to different
wnership types of Chinese commercial banks, the following policies should be considered: (1) reduce the degree of inﬂuence
nd support by the government to the state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs); (2) encourage the joint-stock commercial
anks (JSCBs) to engage in more diversiﬁed activities; (3) relevant agreement should be made between cities to give beneﬁcial
olicies or support to the city commercial banks’ trans-city operation; (4) city commercial banks (CCBs) should focus on
roviding traditional loan services. Finally, for the whole Chinese banking industry, relevant monetary and ﬁscal policies
hould be used to control inﬂation to a certain extent.
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